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constitutional prohibition. 85 Therefore, it is respectfully sug-
gested that either the Supreme Court should reconsider the
problem presented in the King case at the first opportunity or
that the Louisiana Constitution should be amended to close the
door to the possible plundering of state mineral rights for the
benefit of a privileged few which may have been opened in-
advertently by the King decision.
Karl W. Cavanaugh
TORTS - LIABILITY OF CHARITABLE BLOOD BANK FURNISHING
WRONG BLOOD TYPE
Plaintiffs sued defendant blood bank, a charitable corpora-
tion independent of a hospital, for wrongful death resulting
from furnishing the wrong blood type to a hospital patient in
response to a request from her personal physician.' The bank's
customary practice was to charge for blood unless replaced by
donee. Plaintiffs sought recovery on both tort and sales war-
ranty theories. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the
district court's instructed verdict for defendant. Held, chari-
table corporations are immune from tort liability when the fees
charged are devoted to charitable purposes; and since the sup-
plying of blood is the rendition of a service rather than a sale,
plaintiffs cannot recover for breach of warranty. Goelz v. J. K.
& Susie L. Wadley Research Institute & Blood Bank, 350 S.W.2d
573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961; error ref'd n.r.e.).
Litigation in the field of blood transfusions is a fairly recent
visitor to our courts. In the landmark decision of Perlmutter v.
Beth David Hospital2 which involved a hospital's non-negligent
supplying of impure blood8 to its patient, the door was found
closed to recovery under implied warranty. Stressing that the
supplying of blood was entirely subordinate to the over-all func-
tion of the hospital to furnish trained personnel and specialized
35. State ex rel. Board of Oommissioners of Tensas Basin Levee District v.
Grace, 161 La. 1039, 109 So. 830 (1926).
1. An employee of the blood bank whose duty it was to type and cross-match
the patient's blood failed to use the correct sample of blood when he ran tests
and recorded the results on the patient's card.
2. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954) (a 4/3 decision), rehearing denied,
308 N.Y. 812, 125 N.E.2d 869 (1954) ; noted 40 CORN. L.Q. 803 (1955), 69 HABV.
L. REv. 391 (1955), 31 IND. L.J. 367 (1956), 103 U. PA. L. REV. 833 (1955).
3. The impure blood involved was homologous serum hepatitus.
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facilities for the treatment of patients, the court held that the
supplying of blood was not a sale but only an incidental feature
of the patient's contract for hospital services ;4 therefore recov-
ery under sales warranty was precluded. The court observed
that to impose liability on a sales warranty basis would in effect
make the blood supplier an insurer against all injuries flowing
from the blood supplied.5 The Perlmutter holding on warranty
4. Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100, 104, 123 N.E.2d 792,
794 (1954) : "The essence of the contractual relationship between the hospital
and patient is readily apparent; the patient bargains for, and the hospital agrees
to make available, the human skill and physical materiel of medical science to the
end that the patient's health is restored. Such a contract is clearly one for ser-
vices, and, just as clearly, it is not divisible. Concepts of purchase and sale can-
not separately be attached to the healing materials-such as medicines, drugs,
or indeed, blood-supplied by the hospital for a price as part of the medical
services it offers. That the property or title to certain items of medical materials
may be transferred, so to speak, from the hospital to the patient during the course
of medical treatment does not serve to make each such transaction a sale. 'Sale'
and 'transfer' are not synonymous, and not every transfer of personal property
constitutes a sale. It has long been recognized that, when service predominates,
and transfer of personal property is but an incidental feature of the transaction,
the transaction is not deemed a sale within the Sales Act." In support of its
conclusion, the court cited Babcock v. Nudelman, 367 Ill. 626, 12 N.E.2d 635
(1937) (furnishing of eyeglasses in connection with practice of optometry not
within the definition of "selling" in state Retailers' Occupation Tax Act) ; Town
of Saugus v. B. Perini & Sons, 305 Mass. 403, 26 N.E.2d 1 (1940) (contract
to construct a finished highway not sale but service contract and therefore not
within Statute of Frauds) ; Racklin-Fagin Const. Corp. v. Villar, 156 Misc. 220,
281 N.Y. Supp. 426 (1935) (contract to paint picture not sale but service con-
tract and therefore not within Statute of Frauds). It is questionable whether
such authority making a distinction between a sale and a service contract is
valid when a personal injury is involved. Terming a transaction a sale or a ser-
vice contract for the purpose of the Statute of Frauds or a local tax provision
involves different policy considerations than those presented in determining
whether a blood supplier should warrant against injuries caused by his blood.
Generally, the Statute of Frauds merely declares that certain types of oral prom-
ises are not enforceable "to prevent the foisting of an obligation of specified
classes by perjury upon one who had never assented to assume it." 2 ConIBIN,
CONTRASTS § 275, at 3 (1950); the interpretation of a local tax provision is
governed by legislative intent.
5. Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100, 106-07, 123 N.E. 792,
795 (1954). "If . . . the court were to stamp as a sale the supplying of blood-
or the furnishing of other medical aid- it would mean that the hospital, no mat-
ter how careful, no matter that the disease-producing potential in the blood could
not possibly be discovered, would be held responsible, virtually as an insurer, if
anything were to happen to the patient as a result of 'bad' blood. Informed
opinion is at hand that there is today neither a means of detecting the presence
of the jaundice-producing agent in the donor's blood nor a practical method of
treating the blood to be used for transfusion so that the danger may be eliminated,
but, whether that is so or not, the fact is that, if the transaction were to be
deemed a sale, liability would attach irrespective of negligence or other fault."
The following passage provides an insight into the underlying reasons for the
decisions: "The art of healing frequently calls for a balancing of risks and dan-
gers to a patient. Consequently, if injury results from the course adopted, where
no negligence or fault is present, liability should not be imposed upon the institu-
.tion or agency actually seeking to save or otherwise assist the patient." Ibid.
Since blood transfusions are of absolute necessity, the courts would have assured-
ly afforded suppliers of blood an immunity even for negligence if these suppliers
were unable to exist and continue to function with this liability. However, since
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liability has been uniformly followed.6 Recovery in tort, how-
ever, has been available. In jurisdictions in which the charitable
immunity doctrine does not prevent recovery, hospitals have
been held liable for negligence in supplying the wrong blood
the courts feel that blood suppliers can continue to operate under a negligence
liability and suffer no great burden, patients injured in this manner are allowed
to recover for the supplier's carelessness. This process seems nothing more than
a balancing of interests, the court attempting to protect as many interests as
possible without doing harm to one that is vitally needed. Consequently, it would
be illogical for the court to stop evaluating the risks and dangers as medical sci-
ence advances in the field of blood transfusion. If blood suppliers are able to
absorb all of the losses due to injuries from blood transfusions, there should be
no reluctance on the part of the court to impose such a liability.
6. Gile v. Kennewick Public Hospital Dist., 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P.2d 662
(1956). Furnishing of vrong blood type caused patient's death; plaintiff alleged
that the transaction was a sale, since a state statute specifically provided that
the hospital district was not liable for negligence. The court said: "It is ...not
necessary to prove negligence to prove a breach of warranty. However, when
negligence is clearly the proximate cause of the injuries for which damages are
sought, a defendant's statutory immunity for that negligence should bar recovery
even though the negligence has also resulted in a breach of warranty." Id. at
782-83, 296 P.2d at 667. One may suspect from the language used by the court
that if there had been no immunity for negligence, a sale might have been found.
Dibblee v. Dr. W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hospital, 12 Utah 2d 241, 364
P.2d 1085 (1961) (death caused by adverse reaction after a blood transfusion but
no showing the blood was incompatible or impure). The court stated: "We do
not say that hospitals should be immune from negligence. But we think they
should not be strapped with an insurability of blood purity, absent negligence.
The argument that public policy demands that the manufacturer of food, the
fabricator of machines, the dispenser of meals,-all of whom are self-seeking
profit-making beneficiaries of the purchaser, should be bound by an implied war-
ranty, reasonably cannot urge inclusion in such category a traditional institution
of healing and mercy, because it shelves blood for transfusion purposes, where,
perhaps, such storage might be the difference between life and death,-and all
of which it furnished at the cost of procuration, preservation, testing and admin-
istration,- for a few pieces of silver. To conclude otherwise could lead to the
unhappy and unfortunate conclusion that such institutions, of necessity, might
require the patient, (perhaps unconscious) to bring with him his own transfusion
blood .... [H]ospitals furnishing blood, so far as implied warranty is concerned,
are hardly second-cousins to those seeking the public purse for profit, and who,
perchance may be liable on a warranty on the occasion of fly-infested bottle of
pop or a 'broken tooth, suffered by a rock in a roll . . . .As to arguments anent
public policy to protect consumers and distribution of risk, urged by plaintiff,
there are more than one school of thought as to whether it is better to protect
the health of a publicly invited, purchaser-consumer of food in a profit-making
sales market, or the life of an unfortunate, perhaps dying, accident victim who
has no choice but to plead, not barter, for emergency relief. We believe the public
argument may lean more favorably toward favoring the latter." Id. at 243-45, 364
P.2d at 1087-88. But see Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 6 Cal. Reptr. 320,
182 C.A.2d 602 (1960) in which Salk vaccine manufactured by the defendant
caused the plaintiffs to contract poliomyelitis. The vaccine administered was
purchased by a doctor from a pharmacy in a sealed bottle or ampule. "[T]he
rule that the consumer of a food product may recover from the manufacturer
upon implied warranty" was held applicable to this case. "The vaccine is intended
for human consumption quite as much as food. We see no reason to differentiate
the policy considerations requiring pure and wholesome food from those requir-
ing pure and wholesome vaccine." 182 Cal. App. 2d at 607. The court held the
product was warranted merchantable and fit for its intended purpose, both of
which were 'breached. One state has taken a definite position concerning whether
the warranty approach should apply to blood transfusions. "The procurement,
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIV
type7 Of course, recovery in tort necessitates proof of negli-
gence.
In the instant case - the first reported against a blood bank
independent of a hospital - the defendant supplied only the
blood; the hospital rendered all other medical assistance. The
court's continued adherence to the charitable immunity doctrine
prevented recovery for negligence. Relying on Perlmutter, the
court also concluded no action lay for breach of warranty. Since
the factors stressed in Perlmutter for terming the contract one
for services rather than a sale are absent when the blood bank
is independent of any hospital, the decision may reflect policy
considerations rather than a sound distinction between sales
and service contracts. The court could have chosen to evade the
charitable immunity barrier by considering the transaction a
sale with its implied warranty. Often courts utilize non-tort
theories to circumvent an immunity8 which they consider un-
sound or unduly harsh.9 The court's unfriendly approach toward
warranty may represent its continuing conviction in the merits
of the charitable immunity doctrine.'0 The court may, however,
processing, distribution or use of whole blood, plasma, blood products, and blood
derivatives for the purpose of injecting or transfusing the same . . . into the
human body" is and shall be construed to be "the rendition of a service by each
and every person, firm or corporation participating therein," and "shall not be
construed to be, and is declared not to be, a sale . . .for any purpose . . . what-
soever." Calif. Health & Safety Code § 1623. No case involved a blood bank
separate from a hospital.
7. National Homeopathic Hospital v. Phillips, 181 F.2d 293 (D.C. Cir. 1950)
(mislabeling of a blood sample) ; Redding v. United States, 196 F. Supp. 871
(W.D. Ark. 1961) (claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, negligent typing
and cross-matching of blood) ; Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss.
906, 55 So. 2d 142 (1951) (mislabeling of a blood sample) ; Berg v. New York
Soc. for Relief of the Ruptured & Crippled, 154 N.Y.S.2d 455, 136 N.E.2d 523
(1956) (negligent blood typing). But cf. Joseph v. W. H. Groves Latter Day
Saints Hospital, 7 Utah 2d 39, 318 P.2d 330 (1957) (plaintiff failed to prove
negligence causing patient's death; court refused to apply res ipsa loquitur).
8. For example, a nuisance theory may be used to skirt the municipal im-
munity that bars an action based on negligence. Maxwell v. City of Miami, 87
Fla. 107, 100 So. 147 (1924) ; Jenkins v. City of El Dorado, 143 Kan. 206, 53
P.2d 798 (1936); City of Louisville v. Hehemann, 161 Ky. 523, 171 S.W. 165
(1914) ; Jones v. Inhabitants of Great Barrington, 273 Mass. 483, 174 N.E. 118
(1930) ; Gaines v. Village of Wyoming, 147 Ohio St. 491, 72 N.E.2d 369 (1947).
See also Notes, 28 GEO. L.J. 526 (1940), 16 NOTRE DAME LAW. 365 (1941);
1948 Wis. L. REV. 116; Fordham & Pegues, Local Government Responsibility in
Tort in Louisiana, 3 LA. L. REv. 720 (1941) ; PROSSER, TORTS 779 (2d ed. 1955).
Nuisance liability in many cases, however, can be traced to negligence. Max-
well v. City of Miami, 87 Fla. 107, 100 So. 147 (1924) ; Stedwell v. City of
Chicago, 297 Ill. 486, 130 N.E. 729 (1921) ; Roman v. City of Leavenworth, 90
Kan. 379, 133 Pac. 551 (1913) ; Rudibaugh v. City of Niles, 56 Ohio App. 451,
11 N.E.2d 193 (1937) ; PRossER, TORTS 393, 423 (2d ed. 1955).
9. See Note, 46 HARV. L. REv. 305 (1933).
10. See 32 TEMP. L.Q. 86, 96 (1958) for the latest nose count of the dif-
ferent jurisdictions in the treatment accorded the charitable immunity doctrine.
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simply have regarded warranty liability as inappropriate to
the function of blood banks. Warranty has played an important
role in the modern development of strict tort liability against
sellers and manufacturers," a judicial evolution weighed heavily
with policy considerations.12 The disparity in ability to collect
evidence coupled with the recognition that sellers and manufac-
turers are in a better position to distribute the loss as a cost of
production or sale have favored this trend. Courts have allowed
the use of warranty even in situations in which they found no
sale.'8 The court in the instant case may have feared that ac-
ceptance of the warranty theory, which would result in making
With the recent decision of Hungerford v. Portland Sanitorium & Benevolent
Ass'n, 384 P.2d 1009 (Ore. 1963), the number of states that retain total im-
munity has dwindled to 9. "Immunity . . . is now, in general retreat elsewhere.
We conclude that expediency no longer justifies adherence to a dying doctrine."
Id. at 1010.
11. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) ; Note, 23 LA. L. REV. 810 (1963).
12. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960). See Note, 23 LA. L. REv. 810, 814-15, n. 12 (1963).
13. Bailment for hire: Marcos v. Texas Co., 75 Ariz. 45, 251 P.2d 647 (1952)
(gasoline tank) ; Palmquist v. Mercer, 43 Cal. 2d 92, 272 P.2d 26 (1954)
(horses) ; McNeal v. Greenberg, 40 Cal. 2d 740, 255 P.2d 810 (1953) (tractor) ;
Koser v. Hornback, 75 Idaho 24, 265 P.2d 988 (1954) (horses) ; Hilton v.
Wagner, 10 Tenn. App. 173 (1928) (automobile). See Farnsworth, Implied
Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUm. L. REV. 653 (1957) ; 4
WILISTON, CONTRACTS § 1041 (rev. ed. 1936) ; Notes, 31 IND. L.J. 367 (1956),
17 MINN. L. REV. 210 (1933), 78 U. PA. L. REV. 413 (1930).
Contract for services or for work, labor, and materials furnished: Friend v.
Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120 N.E. 407 (1918) (food served by
restaurateur) ; Temple v. Keller, 238 N.Y. 344, 144 N.E. 635 (1924) (same).
See VoL, SALES § 4 (1931) ; 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 9(b) (rev. ed. 1948);
Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L.
REV. 653, 660-65 (1957).
Exchange of goods for services: Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality
in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUm. L. REV. 653, 665 (1957). See Bark v. Dixson, 115
Minn. 172, 131 N.W. 1078 (1911).
Shipper delivering goods to a carrier: International Mercantile Marine Co. v.
Fels, 170 Fed. 275 (2d Cir. 1909) ; Bamfield v. Goole & Sheffield Transport Co.
[1920] 2 K.B. 94; PROSSER, TORTS 496 (2d ed. 1955). See Rixford v. Smith,
52 N.H. 355, 13 Am. Rep. 42 (1872).
Short term lease agreement for furnished apartment: Fisher v. Pennington,
116 Cal. App. 248, 2 P.2d 518 (1931) ; Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E.
286 (1892) ; Morgenthau v. Ehrich, 77 Misc. 139, 136 N.Y. Supp. 140 (1912).
Even when the charitable immunity doctrine has not been involved, courts
have readily found a sale in order to utilize the warranty approach. This is
illustrated by the food cases in which courts recognize that warranty is an
appropriate theory to use when the purchaser must rely on the seller's assurance
of delivering merchantable and reasonably fit preparations for human consump-
tion. Travis v. Louisville & N.R.R., 183 Ala. 415, 62 So. 851 (1913) ; Friend v.
Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120 N.E. 407 (1918) ; Temple v. Keller,
238 N.Y. 344, 144 N.E. 635 (1924). See DicKxRsON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND
TiE FOOD CONSUMER 157-80 (1951) ; Brown, The Liability of Retail Dealers for
Defective Food Products, 23 MINN. L. REV. 585 (1939) ; Waite, Retail Responsi-
bility and Judicial Law Making, 34 MIcH. L. REV. 494 (1936) ; PROSSER, The
Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 117, 147 (1943);
Note, 20 MINN. L. REv. 527 (1936).
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blood suppliers insurers even where blood impurities were medi-
cally undetectable, would discourage or do irreparable harm to
a function that is vitally necessary.
14
Labeling the transaction a "service" or a "sale" is mislead-
ing and conceals the real issues in question. Whether a hospital
or independent blood bank is involved, the courts, after inquir-
ing into medical facts concerning blood transfusions and the
risks involved for both the patient and the supplier, should de-
cide whether the policy behind strict tort or warranty liability
is appropriate to suppliers of blood. The extension of legal lia-
bility in blood transfusion cases must keep pace with the medical
development in this field, and perhaps a degree of non-fault
liability would provide impetus toward achieving a completely
safe transfusion.
Anthony J. Bruscato
WATER RESOURCES - LIMITATIONS ON CONSUMPTION OF
SUBTERRANEAN WATER
While engaged in secondary recovery operations, defendant
oil operator withdrew fresh water from a shallow sand and
14. For a discussion of the medical consideration, see Note, 42 MINN. L. REV.
640 (1948); Blood Transfusions-Medicolegal Responsibilities, 163 A.M.A.J.
283 (1957) ; Medicolegal Aspects of Blood Transfusion, 151 A.M.A.J. 1435
(1953) ; Prevention of Accidents in Blood Transfusions, 156 A.M.A.J. 1301
(1954). "From a medical standpoint, the taking and transfusion of blood have
evolved from difficult to relatively simple technique, while at the same time the
number of accidents has apparently increased appreciably. This is characteristic
of medical progress, for as the number of lifesaving procedures increase the
number of accidents tend to increase even though the ratio of accidents to treat-
ment may remain constant or even diminish." 163 A.M.A.J. 283, 288. "Many
of the accidents that have occurred are directly attributable to untrained interns
and physicians who performed these tests at night or on holidays, in the absence
of regularly assigned technicians." Id. at 283. "Probably the most serious risk
relating to blood transfusion and one that defies medical science and preventive
measures is the danger of transmitting hepatitis. Careful screening and question-
ing of donors may to a limited degree lessen this risk." Id. at 285. For a
discussion of the risks and dangers in blood transfusions and present medical
research being done concerning detection of hepatitis, see Life, Feb. 15, 1963,
p. 70. See also Medicolegal Aspects of Blood Transfusions, 16 Current Medicine
for Attorneys 35 (1957) ; Tortious Aspects of Blood Donations'and Blood Trans-
fusions, 2 CURRENT MEDICINE FOR ATTORNEYS 38 (1953) ; Hemolytic Transfusions
Reactions-Medicolegal Aspects, 2 J. OF FORENSIC MEDICINE 78 (1955) ; 6
LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA § 42.33 (1961); Blood Transfusions - Medico-
legal Responsibilities, (March) MEDICAL TRIAL TEcHNIQuE Q. 31 (1958);
Responsibilities in Blood Transfusions, (June) MEDICOLEGAL DIGEST 1:21-28
(1960).
[Vol. XXIV
